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Last year, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,' the Supreme Court
once again struggled with the constitutionality of affirmative action. The
struggle revolves around the tension inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment,
which mandates the elimination of discrimination while simultaneously compel-
ling the equal protection of all people. This tension is apparent where the
elimination of discrimination requires that particular groups be treated disparate-
ly. Where the effects of discrimination continue to disadvantage a group even
after the explicit discriminatory practice has been prohibited, preferential
treatment may be necessary to remedy the continued discriminatory impact. In
order to restore a disadvantaged minority to real equality, therefore, a govern-
ment may have to employ a program that bestows remedial benefits on the
basis of race. Absent such means, the group may continue to suffer the effects
of past discrimination perpetuated by the application of facially neutral laws
to the status quo.
Unfortunately, the Croson decision does little to resolve the conflicting
mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment.' If anything, the decision perpetuates
the tension. The broad directives of the decision recognize the continued need
to redress past specific discrimination, implying that the Fourteenth Amendment
1. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
2. Richmond's Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) set-aside program, which allocated a fixed
percentage of government contracts to minority owned businesses, was struck down as unconstitutional.
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may occasionally compel disparate treatment. However, the highly restrictive
test adopted by the Court to establish the existence of such discrimination,
which is required as a prerequisite for the application of race-based remedies,
signals an effective intolerance of such programs.
Croson is in conflict with itself. Decisionmakers seeking direction from the
Court are left with unclear signals.3 This Note recommends that Congress
correct the internal contradiction within the Court's opinion and alleviate the
potential impairment of remedial action caused by Croson. The federal legisla-
tive answer proposed replaces the Court's overly narrow test for determining
whether race-based relief is appropriate with a congressional test which seeks
to recognize and respond to the lingering effects of past discrimination. The
authority for such congressional action rests on the special enforcement powers
granted to Congress by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. CROSON'S CONTRADICTION
In 1983, the City of Richmond adopted an MBE set-aside program which
required primary contractors to subcontract at least thirty percent of their
contract work to minority-owned businesses. The program was adopted with
the stated purpose of remedying past discrimination. The Supreme Court,
however, found that the city had not adequately established past discrimination
in its construction industry to justify "race-based relief' under the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4
A. The Remedial Mandate
Justice O'Connor, who authored the majority opinion, explicitly endorsed
the constitutionality of race-conscious affirmative remedies in certain circum-
stances.' She emphasized that a state or local government is not limited merely
to correcting discrimination by the governmental unit itself,6 but may justify
its program by showing that "it had essentially become a 'passive participant'
in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction
industry."7 She stated that any governmental entity, whether federal, state, or
local, has a compelling interest in assuring that its spending does not contribute
3. Confusion over what constitutes sufficient evidence of specific discrimination within a locality may
cause the premature dismantling or abandonment of needed MBE programs. The City of Richmond, for
example, has discontinued its MBE progam altogether. Yet, the evidence suggests that minority firms are
continuing to have difficulty obtaining work in Richmond's construction industry. Since Richmond
abandoned its program, the percentage of contracting work subcontracted to minority firms has fallen from
32% to 11%. Reidinger, Life After Croson, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1990, at 33.
4. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 723.
5. Id. at 720.
6. Justice O'Connor deliberately overruled the Court of Appeals which held that Richmond must show
that the City itself had discriminated against minority contractors to justify its MBE program. Id.
7. Id.
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to the perpetuation of discrimination.' Once it is shown that the government
has become a passive participant, she concluded it "could take affirmative steps
to dismantle such a system."9 Thus, a government may in some instances
remedy the effects of past discrimination through the adoption of a race-based
program. To justify use of such a remedy, Justice O'Connor stressed that all
governments have an interest in ensuring that public monies are used in the
furtherance, rather than hindrance, of equal opportunity. 0
B. The Limitations on the Remedy
This broad confirmation of the legitimacy of affirmative remedies in some
situations contradicts the very narrow threshold test for application of race-
based programs set out by the Court later in the opinion." The city of Rich-
mond relied on the following "findings" to establish the existence of discrimi-
nation: a statistical study indicating that, although the city's population was
50% Black, only 0.67% of its prime construction contracts had been awarded
to minority businesses in recent years; figures establishing that a variety of local
contractors associations had virtually no MBE members; the City Counsel's
conclusion that the plan was constitutional under Fullilove v. Klutznick,12 and
the statements of plan proponents indicating that there had been widespread
racial discrimination in the local, state, and national construction industries.
13
The Court, however, rejected the validity of these justifications. Justice O'Con-
nor explained that a generalized assertion of past discrimination did not create
a justification for the use of race-based remedies, because such an assertion
provided no guidance as to how to determine the scope of the injury or design
a remedy tailored to that injury.14 While the Court did stress that a government
could constitutionally implement a race-based program to remedy specific and
identifiable local discrimination,15 it found that Richmond's factual record did
not constitute sufficient evidence of such discrimination. 6
The Court also concluded that the city could not rely on "Congress' finding
in connection with the set-aside approved in Fullilove that there had been
nationwide discrimination in the construction industry."'17 The Court had previ-
ously established that Congress could take action to correct the effects of past




11. See Stewart, Set-Asides Set Aside, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 46 (discussing confusion between
Croson's broad and narrow standards).
12. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
13. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 714.
14. Id. at 723.
15. Id. at 729.
16. Id. at 728.
17. Id. at 726.
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Fourteenth Amendment. 8 The Croson Court, however, rejected the argument
that national findings could be applied by local governments to justify their
MBE programs. The rationale rested on the distinction the Court drew between
Congress' broad power under section 5 to remedy "a prior pattern of discrimi-
nation" and the states' more limited authorization to correct specific discrimina-
tion supported directly by their own spending practices.19 While the general
congressional finding could continue to provide justification for a federal
program, it could not be adopted to justify a state or local MBE program.
The Court's treatment of Richmond's statistical evidence provides insight
into the threshold test that must be met to justify the use of race-based relief
by a city or state. The Court found that the two statistical groups Richmond
relied upon to show that discrimination was present in the local construction
industry were not adequately connected." The city had used the discrepancy
between the percentage of contracts awarded to minority firms (0.67%) and the
relative size of the city's Black population (50%) to conclude that there had
been discrimination against minority contractors. The Court did not find this
to be a relevant comparison and determined that "where special qualifications
are necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating
discriminatory exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to under-
take the particular task."' Thus the Court concluded that a "qualified contrac-
tors" formula, which compared the percentage of minority firms receiving
contracts to the percentage of minority firms currently available, was required
to establish specific and identified discrimination.
A comparison to the number of minority firms available may be meaning-
less, however, where minorities are deterred from founding their own firms in
the first place because discrimination is known to preclude their success.' As
18. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483.
19. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 727.
20. Id. at 725.
21. Id. at 714.
22. Id. at 725.
23. The danger in relying solely on the Court's "qualified contractors" comparison has been described
in a recent statement published by a group of prominent constitutional scholars:
Pervasive discrimination does not merely operate at the application stage; its more subtle and
perhaps more serious consequence is to deter and discourage members of minority groups from
even seeking to enter the market for occupations, business opportunities or homes in certain
neighborhoods. This consequence is an especially appropriate target of remedial policies. When
courts seek to determine the existence and extent of past discrimination by making statistical
comparisons to relevant labor pools, it is critical that such courts recognize the extent to which
such discrimination may itself have produced smaller numbers in the comparable minority
population. This may be especially important in the area of contracting or subcontracting, where
the perceived demand for minority subcontractors may be the determinative factor in minority
business formation. Without such consideration of deterrence, courts might well create a Catch-22
for cities seeking to implement sound affirmative action policies for subcontracting.
Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98
YALE Li. 1711, 1714 (1989); see also Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE Li. 453, 484 n.136 (1987) ("The
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a result, application of the "qualified contractors" test will tend to hide the
continued existence of discriminatory impact on a group. This test may thus
preclude the use of race-based remedies where the continued effects of past dis-
crimination are most pronounced. This result is at odds with the broad direction
outlined earlier in the opinion, which generally acknowledges the need for
remedies that redress the effects of past discrimination.
C. The Practical Contradiction
While the Court's statistical comparison is unlikely to identify the continu-
ing effects of past discrimination, the use of nonstatistical evidence is fraught
with political danger. 4 It is likely that politicians will be hesitant to admit that
their administration has contributed to past discrimination, even through mere
acquiescence Such an admission could be politically detrimental to individu-
al representatives. Naturally, it is easier and politically safer to attribute current
problems to broad societal defects than to specific acts of discrimination.
Politicians are more likely to implement beneficial programs if they can do so
without impugning their own policy.' Documentation of identified discrimi-
nation may work exclusively as a disincentive to vote-conscious politicians,
rather than as an incentive to redress past wrongs. Consequently, a rule that
requires a direct, nonstatistical showing of past or present specific discrimi-
nation may create an insurmountable obstacle to remedial action within the
context of practical political considerations.
The reality of American life is that discrimination and its effects continue
to play a dominant role in our society.27 The need for government to eliminate
this discrimination also continues.' This is especially true in the construction
industry, where the effects of discrimination continue to have a significant
depressive effect of discrimination on the incentives of racial minorities and women to participate in
employment and government programs has been judicially recognized.") (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (employment); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 163-64 (1977) (voting)).
24. See U.S. v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 E2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 976 (1984) ("Inquiry into the motives of elected officials can be both difficult and undesirable, and
such inquiry should be avoided when possible.") (footnote omitted).
25. See Constitutional Scholars' Statement, supra note 23, at 1714 (courts should not require that race-
based remedies be predicated on "compromising public admissions").
26. See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REv. 317, 326 (1987) ("[W]ithout the necessity for blame, our resistance to accepting the need
and responsibility for remedy will be lessened.").
27. See id. at 322 ("Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has
played and still plays a dominant role."); Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will
We Ever Be Saved? (Book Review), 97 YALE L.J. 923, 928-47 (1988) (Black story about America is story
of racism and exclusion).
28. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721 ("[W]e [do not] view 'racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon
of the past' or [believe] that 'government bodies need no longer preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial
injustice."') (quoting Marshall, J., dissenting).
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impact.29 There is evidence that government procurement practices, while race-
neutral on their face, may actually result in the perpetuation of private discrimi-
nation. 0 Further, the nature of the construction industry creates a unique
opportunity for government bodies to effect change.
31
The Croson opinion is in conflict with itself. It suggests a need for race-
conscious remedial action to redress the effects of past discrimination. Yet it
requires a test which is likely to prevent such redress where it is needed most.
Congress can resolve this tension and affirmatively remedy the effects of past
discrimination that continue to disadvantage minorities.
II. A CONGRESSIONAL SOLUTION
Congress should revise the test that the Court set out as a prerequisite for
race-conscious remedial action. Specifically, Congress should replace the
"qualified contractors" test with one that is better suited to identifying the
continuing effects of past discrimination. Such a test would correct the contra-
diction within the Croson decision, thereby fulfilling the overall spirit of
Croson.
29. In addition to the normal problems inherent in starting a new business, MBE's must also overcome
extra financial hurdles resulting from racial barriers in obtaining financing. See R. GLOVER, MINORITY
ENTERPRISE IN CONSTRUCTION 40-42,57-60,73 (1977). This discrimination is especially destructive in light
of the greater dependency minority contractors tend to have on long term debt, a dependency which derives
from the baseline economic disadvantages confronting most minorities. See id. at 40-44. Further, prejudice
and institutional discrimination which persist in the bonding market significantly reduce the ability of
minorities to secure the bonding essential to qualify for government contracts. See id. at 57-60. Not only
do financing and bonding requirements tend to perpetuate the effects of past and lingering discrimination,
but the historical lack of access to training and apprenticeship programs has inhibited the initial entry of
minorities into the construction industry. See id. at 116-17; see e.g., Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l
Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,427 (1986) (evidence found that Blacks had been persistently excluded from
union and apprenticeship programs).
30. Public contracts typically have more stringent bonding requirements than equivalent contracts in
the private sector. See R. GLOVER, supra note 29, at 73. As a result, the harm caused to minorities by private
discrimination in the bonding industry is exacerbated because the contracting requirements force greater
reliance on the bonding market for access to prized government contracts. Id. Consequently, merely race-
neutral government procedures not only fail to correct the effects of past discrimination, but can actually
perpetuate the effects of nongovernmental discrimination. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478 ("Congress had
abundant historical basis from which it could conclude that traditional procurement practices, when applied
to minority businesses, could perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination."); Rosenfeld, Decoding
Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729,
1766 (1989) ("[Sleemingly race-neutral factors invoked by the Court remain so only when viewed in
isolation. In the context of systematic racial discrimination, these factors take on another light, as they are
likely to exacerbate the relative disadvantages experienced by victims of racism.").
31. In the construction industry, government contracting work is typically "one of the few available
routes to breaking into construction." R. GLOVER, supra note 29, at 73 (quoting "an established white
contractor"). Given the limited opportunity for entry into the industry, it is imperative that access to
government contracting be affirmatively kept open.
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A. Why Congress?
Experience with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 suggests that a legislative
solution is preferable to a judicial approach. Prior to the adoption of the Voting
Rights Act, discriminatory voting practices could only be identified and elimi-
nated on a case-by-case basis.32 This required extensive and inefficient com-
mitments of time and resources for each case, with the result that each enforce-
ment action did little to rectify the overall problem 3 The Voting Rights Act,
on the other hand, identified discriminatory practices automatically and allowed
systemic change to be implemented.' Congress could do the same with re-
spect to the adoption of MBE set-aside programs and eliminate the need to
develop factual records of specific discrimination on a case-by-case or city-by-
city basis.
35
Where discrimination is determined to exist, a systematic program could
be applied to eliminate the effects of that discrimination in a consistent and
geographically uniform fashion, irrespective of local ability or initiative to adopt
necessary race-based remedies under the Croson standard.
36
Finally, a federal solution would lift the burden of responsibility for indenti-
fying discriminatory effect in the construction industry out of the local political
arena and place the burden on federal legislators, who are in a better position
to develop a fair and efficient standard.37 An independent statistical test devel-
oped by Congress would relieve politicians at the state and local level from the
32. See Note, Civil Rights-Voting Rights Act of 1965, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1411, 1412 (1966).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 476-77 (Congress acted within its competence when it determined that pattern
of disadvantage and discrimination within construction industry was national in scope and that nationally
applied federal program was necessary to effectively redress effects of such pattern); Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 134 (1970) (recognized that discrimination on basis of race is problem of national scope
affecting all parts of country and that, as such, national solution undertaken by Congress is appropriate
solution).
36. Further, Congress has the broad perspective implicit in national governance to recognize that full
equality requires not only equal treatment devoid of discriminatory intent, but also equal participation in
the economic power structure which shapes our political system. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHiL. & PUB. AHF. 107, 152 (1976) (Blacks' economic position as perpetual underclass has
contributed to their political disempowerment). Just as Congress recognized that discrimination in voting
must be eradicated to ensure equal protection in the political process, Congress could acknowledge that
expanded participation in the economic system through government contracting allocations is a necessary
step toward greater equality in the society at large. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 465-66 ("The presumption
must be made that past discriminatory systems have resulted in present economic inequities. In order to right
this situation, the Congress has formulated certain remedial programs designed to uplift those socially or
economically disadvantaged persons to a level where they may effectively participate in the business
mainstream of our economy.") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 468, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1975)). Cf. NV.
WILsON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 110 (1987) (arguing that race-specific policies do little to help truly
disadvantaged Blacks and therefore may actually obscure real issues of racial dominance).
37. Congress' fact-finding authority and abilities far outstrip those of state and local governments. See
Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CmI. L. REV. 199, 229 (1971) (usual
judicial deference to legislative judgments of fact combined with special section 5 enforcement powers make
federal finding of fact superior to finding of state legislature or of court).
1990]
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necessity of identifying and documenting specific instances of discrimination
within their own government structures."
B. The Legislative Proposal: A New Test
The Proposed Statute
(a) To assure that access to publicly funded contracts is not inhibited
on the basis of race or color, each state and local government which is
found to exhibit discrimination in the award of government contracts
under subsection (b), may [shall] adopt a minority business enterprise
set-aside program. The program must be structured to ensure that a
sufficient percentage of all government contracting expenditures shall
be expended for minority business enterprises to redress the discrimina-
tion found to exist under subsection (b). For purposes of this section,
the term 'minority business enterprise' means a business at least fifty
percent of which is owned by minority group members. For purposes
of the preceding sentence, 'minority group members' will be defined
on a case-by-case basis to include the minorities historically disadvan-
taged in the state or locality. Nationally, historically disadvantaged
groups have included African-Americans, Latinos, Asians, and Native
Americans. There must be evidence that a national minority group has
had local historical presence for purposes of interpreting 'historically
disadvanged' within this section. Such evidence will be derived from
U.S. Census information, or in the absence of relevant Census data,
from other reliable and accepted population surveys. This program shall
include a waiver provision to be granted where compliance with the set-
aside requirement is shown to be impossible. The implementation of the
program shall be limited to five-year renewable periods accommodating
a periodic review schedule. The program may [shall] be renewed until
such time as the state or local government comes into compliance with
subsection (b).
(b) The existence of specific discrimination within a state or locality
will be established where the ratio of the number of nonminority con-
tracting firms to the nonminority population exceeds the ratio of the
number of minority contracting firms to the minority population by a
statistically significant factor.
(c) The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is empowered to
monitor discrimination in the award of state and local government
38. In addition to the political disincentive, a nonstatistical test may prove unduly burdensome for local
governments. See Taylor, The Equal Protection Dilemma of Voluntary State and Local Set-Aside Programs
for Minorities and Women, 27 HOUs. L. REV. 45, 77 (1990) (comprehensive record now required under
Croson to justify adoption of MBE set-aside program is burdensome for resource-limited governmental
agencies). Cf. Constitutional Scholars' Statement, supra note 23, at 1713 ("[Ihe [Croson] Court has also
rejected the notion that local governments may implement such remedial programs only if they bear the
tortuous and often divisive burden of documenting specific incidents of purposeful past discrimination on
identified occasions.").
[Vol. 100: 451
Croson: A Federal Legislative Answer
contracts as set forth in subsection (b). [The Attorney General is em-
powered to bring enforcement actions pursuant to noncompliance with
subsections (a) and (b). Minority group members harmed by the exis-
tence of continued discriminatory impact as identified in subsection (b)
are also empowered to bring private enforcement actions pursuant to
noncompliance with subsections (a) and (b).]
The congressional program outlined above employs a new statistical test
which can be applied to determine whether discrimination exists in the con-
struction industry of a particular region. State and local governments in regions
failing to satisfy this test would adopt a MBE set-aside program tailored to the
local problem. Congress has the Court's authorization to remedy the effects of
discrimination not caused directly by the federal government,39 and it would
be comingling this initiative with the interests of state and local governments
in not supporting discrimination with their purses. To a large extent, Congress
would be building on the Court's directives.
The point at which the proposed standard diverges from the Court's stan-
dard for using race-based remedies centers on the use of statistical comparisons.
The proposed legislation attempts to incorporate the hidden effects of past and
present discrimination, which the "qualified contractors" test neglects to ad-
dress. The comparison is between two ratios, a nonminority ratio and a minority
ratio. Each ratio is calculated by dividing the number of firms by the relevant
populations. Thus, the number of nonminority firms is divided by total
nonminority population, and the number of minority firms is divided by the
total minority population.4' The resulting figures are then compared, and if
the nonminority ratio is significantly higher than the minority ratio, indicating
that a higher percentage of the nonminority population is involved in the
construction industry than the percentage of the minority population involved,
discrimination is determined to exist.4
The design of the congressional standard is derived from sections 4(a) and
4(b) of the Voting Rights Act,42 which were intended to prohibit discrimina-
tory state voting procedures. Congress developed a uniform statistical standard
to serve as evidence of unlawful state practices. If a state falls below the
statute's statistical standard and it employs a voter qualification test, there is
a presumption that discrimination exists in that state's voting system. A finding
that less than half of the people in the state registered or voted in a past
presidential election signals that the qualification test works to create a discrimi-
natory exclusion of minorities. Insufficient voter turnout is correlated with voter
39. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478.
40. Compare o nonminortyfirms to # f minorit firms
nonmmority population minorit popl ation
41. The ratio avoids the simplistic comparison rejected by Croson, which measured the percentage of
contracts given to minority firms directly against the minority population percentage, and instead creates
a comparison of the proportional involvement of each relevant group in the industry.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1982).
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exclusion. Thus Congress employed a result-based statistical screening formula
to generate evidence of unlawful discrimination. The proposed statute mirrors
this statistical test and uses it to identify discrimination in the construction
industry.
Congress did not use the "qualified contractors" test for implementation of
its own MBE set-aside program.43 Further, the Court acknowledged con-
gressional authority under section 5 to use a broader statistical comparison to
establish the existence of discrimination" than the Croson "qualified contrac-
tors" comparison which state and local governments were required to satisfy. 5
By developing a standard that goes beyond the Court's "qualified contractors"
test, this legislation begins to incorporate the hidden exclusionary effects of
discrimination. The comparison ratio outlined above should identify discrimina-
tion that has resulted in the exclusion of minorities from initial entry into the
construction industry and allow the camouflaged consequences of past discrimi-
nation to be redressed.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSAL
Congress occupies a special role in the enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This role includes the duty to redress the effects of unlawful
discrimination and, where necessary, impose appropriate remedies. Thus
Congress can and should develop legislation to remedy historical discrimination
in the construction industry.
A. The Proposal is Largely Consistent with Croson
The majority of the provisions within the proposed legislation are derived
directly from Fullilove and Croson. For example, the requirement "that a
sufficient percentage of all government construction expenditures shall be
expended for minority business enterprises to redress the discrimination found
to exist under subsection (b)" is intended to ensure that the percentage of
contracts set aside is sufficent to effectively remedy the problem, but not so
large as to go beyond what is needed to "cure the effects of prior discrimina-
tion."46 The Fullilove Court upheld the congressional ten percent set-aside
only after it determined that the impact on access to government contracts by
nonminorities would be "light" and therefore did not impose an unnecessary
43. Fultilove, 448 U.S. at 459 (relied on comparison of percentage of minority firms receiving federal
contracts to percentage of minorites in population as whole).
44. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719.
45. Id. at 725.
46. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484.
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burden on a particular racial group.' Thus, the set-aside provision in the
proposed legislation allows for flexibilty in adopting a percentage requirement
that will balance the need for redress of discrimination with the Court's concern.
that the impact on nonminorities not be unnecessarily burdensome.
The proposed legislation also incorporates the Croson directive that race-
based remedial programs be "narrowly tailored. ' 48 There is a provision defin-
ing "minority" on a local basis, which addresses the Court's concern about
overinclusiveness. The Court found that Richmond's program was not narrowly
tailored because it included, as beneficiaries, minority groups that had no
historical connection to Richmond.4 9 By defining "minority" to include only
those groups actually disadvantaged by past discrimination within a locality,
the proposed legislation is not overinclusive. The waiver provision is included
in response to the Court's finding in Fullilove that, absent the federal govern-
ment's waiver provision, the set-aside legislation would not have passed muster
because of the potential for program misapplication and unreasonable price
blackmailing." The final "narrow tailoring" provision requires that the pro-
gram authorization be limited to five-year periods to ensure that periodic re-
examination will occur.51 This limited duration provision should prevent the
continuation of programs past the point where the effects of discrimination
continue to be felt.52
B. Congressional Power to Override
The proposed solution siginificantly diverges from the Court's interpretation
as to when race-based remedies may be employed. It might be argued that the
alternative test proposed effectively overrides the constitutional holding in
Croson. To the extent the legislation does overrule Croson, Congress may
legitimately do so under its unique section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. An examination of the history, interpretation, and use of this
power since its creation with the adoption of the Civil War Amendments
provides a basis for this assertion.
47. Id. at 484-85. The Court also concluded that "it was within congressional power to act on the
assumption that in the past some nonminority businesses may have reaped competitive benefit over the years
from the virtual exclusion of minority firms from these contracting opportunities." Id. at 485.
48. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 728.
49. Id.
50. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 487. See also Days, supra note 23, at 484 ("[T]he program should contain
explicit provisions for waiver of the specified percentages in cases where it can be established that they
are unattainable or unrealistic despite best efforts.").
51. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will conduct the periodic review under its
monitoring responsibilities outlined in subsection (c) of the proposed act. The Commission has analogous
enforcement duties under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and has developed expertise to monitor
employment discrimination of both private and governmental employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
52. See Days, supra note 23, at 484 (recommending governments specify program duration).
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1. The Section 5 Power
A central goal in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment was to provide
Congress with a powerful tool that could be used to shape and support the
propagation of equal protection ideals.53 The country was recovering from the
wounds inflicted by the Civil War, and the federal government was charged
with the duty of developing and implementing a plan of Reconstruction that
would move the country towards freedom and equality for Black Americans.54
The Fourteenth Amendment ensured that Congress had a constitutional basis
to pursue this mandate to protect fundamental rights.55
The amendment was drafted primarily by Representative Bingham of Ohio,
who set out to create a constitutional basis for the Civil Rights Act of 1866.56
The distinguishing feature of Bingham's proposal and the real strength of
the amendment was the express grant of an enforcement power to Congress.58
Both proponents and opponents of the bill recognized the broad potential for
expansion of Congressional power in section 5.59
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment contains both a direct limitation on the
states (section 1) and the grant of enforcement power to Congress (section 5).
Professor Bohrer has developed a helpful theory to explain the connection
between these two provisions.6 Bohrer suggests, "Congress cannot possibly
'enforce' section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment without first interpreting the
provisions to be enforced. [Congress has] primacy in enforcement, granted by
section 5, [and this] necessarily entails primacy in interpretation."' 6' Thus,
Congress can interpret section 1 to prohibit the perpetuation of the effects of
past discrimination even where the Court has previously interpreted section 1
to preclude redress for the continuing effects of past discrimination.
Modern judicial interpretation of the enforcement powers granted to Con-
gress by the Civil War Amendments began with challenges to the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.62 The first of these was South Carolina v. Katzenbach.63 The
53. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had four general goals: to guarantee certain civil
liberties against state action; to apply these liberties equally to all citizens, regardless of race; to give
Congress wide power to enforce the amendment and expand civil rights; and to make the federal government
the ultimate guarantor of individual civil rights. See 2 R. ROTUNDA, 3. NOWAX & . YOUNG, TREATISE ON
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.7, 378-79 (1986).
54. See C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNiON 1274-75 (1971).
55. See H. FLACK, THE ADopTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT 59, 92, 96 (1908).
56. Id. at 30-32, 79.
57. Other proposals considered by the Committee of Fifteen did not include enforcement provisions.
See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 54, at 1280.
58. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §5.
59. See H. FLACK, supra note 55, at 136-39.
60. See Bohrer, Bakke, Weber and Fullilove: Benign Discrimination and Congressional Power To
Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 56 IND. L. 473, 492 (1981).
61. Bohrer, supra note 60, at 493. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (powers delegated
to three branches are not hermetically sealed from one another).
62. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
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State of South Carolina challenged section 4(a) and 4(b) of the Act, on the
basis that these provisions constituted an invasion of a state's traditional power
to regulate voter qualifications and election procedures. Chief Justice Warren
applied a deferential standard for review of federal voting rights legislation,
which required simply that the challenged measure be appropriate, be adapted
to the end of eliminating voting discrimination, and not be prohibited by any
other constitutional provision.6' The Court emphasized Congress' primary role
in enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment 66 and Congress' broad discretion
to select those remedies it finds likely to be most efficacious without regard
to existing judicial remedies.67 The Court has interpreted the scope of enforce-
ment powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 2 of
the Fifteenth Amendment to be essentially coextensive.
68
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,69 a case drawing upon the rationale of South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court solidified a broad interpretation of Congress'
section 5 power. Morgan involved a challenge to section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,70 which forbade the use of literacy requirements for voters
educated in Puerto Rico. Enactment of the legislation followed on the heels of
Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board,71 which held that literacy tests did
not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment absent some showing of dis-
criminatory application.72 The Morgan Court upheld congressional authority
to adopt section 4(e), despite its previous contradictory holding in Lassiter.73
Section 4(e) was challenged by the state of New York, where such tests
were required, on the basis that "Congress [had] exceeded the powers granted
to it by the Constitution and therefore usurped powers reserved to the States
63. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
64. Section 4(a) prohibits the use of voting tests or devices in states that, under section 4(b), have less
than 50% of the persons of voting age registered. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
65. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326.
66. "[T]he Framers indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing [Fifteenth
Amendment] rights . .. " Id. (citing Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880) ("It is the power of
Congress which has been enlarged.")).
67. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327.
68. See lames v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 136 (1903) (Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power similar
to that granted by Fourteenth Amendment); Burt, Miranda and Title 11: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 S.
Ct. Rev. 81, 103 (enforcement provisions of Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are identical).
69. 384 U.X. 641 (1966).
70. Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(e), 79 Stat. 437,439 (1965) (currently codified at42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e)(1)
(1982)).
71. 360 U.S. 45 (1959)
72. See Carter, The Morgan "Power" and The Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819, 820 (1986).
73. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648-49 ("A construction of §5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] that would
require a judicial determination that the enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress violated the
Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate both congressional
resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment. It would confine the
legislative power in this context to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial
branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by
particularizing the 'majestic generalities' of §I of the Amendment.") (foolnote omitted).
1990]
The Yale Law Journal
by the Tenth Amendment."' The Court held that the provision was "a proper
exercise of the powers granted to Congress by section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'75 Relying on Ex Parte Virginia,76 Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, rejected the claim that section 4(e) could not be sustained unless
the Court itself found that the literacy requirement forbidden by section 4(e)
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.77 The Court further held that Congress
has an independent power to identify discrimination and to select the appropri-
ate means to remedy it.78 Finally, the Court held that its review of the exercise
of Fourteenth Amendment congressional enforcement power is limited to an
attempt to "perceive a basis" for the congressional action.79
There is heated debate among constitutional scholars as to the extent
Morgan and its progeny provide precedent for congressional authority to
explicitly overrule a Supreme Court decision in the realm of equal protection
jurisprudence.80 However, this debate may be irrelevant given Congress' past
effective override of a constitutional interpretation issued by the Court in the
voting rights area and the Court's subsequent acquiescense to the congressional
override."1
2. Exercise of Section 5 Power
Congress exercised its section 5 prerogative with the adoption of the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982,82 amending section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act and effectively overriding the Court's interpretation of a constitutional
74. Id. at 646.
75. Id. This case was decided under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fifteenth Amendment
because Congress explicitly enacted the challenged statute to secure rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(3) (1982).
76. 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
77. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648.
78. Id. at 653.
79. Id.
80. Compare Burt, supra note 68 and Carter, supra note 72 and Cox, supra note 37 with Brest,
Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L REV.
57 (1986) and Emerson, The Power of Congress to Change Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court:
The Human Life Bill, 77 NW. U.L. REV. 129 (1982) and Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional
Rights: Reflections on Proposed "Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333 (1982). However, this
scholarly debate may obscure the real issues underlying the proposed legislation. The more interesting focus,
as identified by Professor Carter in his article on the Morgan power, lies not in the technical legal approach
wherein a justification for adoption of controversial legislation is built upon the foundation of potentially
debatable constitutional theory, but rather in the examination of the moral or political value of the right
sought to be expanded or limited by the Morgan power. See Carter, supra note 72, at 846 ("If we persist
in burying arguments over policy under an avalanche of constitutional jargon, then those who want to speak
most closely to the point-whether the proposed legislation is good or bad-will essentially be denied a
hearing.").
8 1. See infra Section V.B.2.
82. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973b, 1973aa-la,
1973aa-6 (1982)).
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provision.8 3 The amendments sought to change the constitutional standard
established by the Court in City of Mobile v. Bolden for determining whether
discrimination was present in Mobile's at-large voting system. 4 In Bolden,
the Court interpreted the equal protection clause to require that a racial vote
dilution claimant must prove discriminatory purpose to establish a violation of
constitutional law.85 The congressional amendments created a new result-
oriented test.
8 6
In Bolden, the Court had specifically rejected the use of a results-oriented
test and found that a complete absence of minority representation on Mobile's
City Commission did not justify a finding of discrimination within the reach
of the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth AmendmentY Thus, Congress overrode the
Court's pure intent requirement by including effect or result-based criteria in
the determination of whether the qualification or practice is discriminatory and
therefore unlawful.88 In effect, Congress reinterpreted what constituted a viola-
tion of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in response to a judicial
interpretation it found to be incorrect.
In United States v. Marengo County Commission,9 defendants challenged
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982. Defendants
argued that Congress overextended its enforcement powers when it enacted the
amendments, and had, in effect, "usurped the power of the Supreme Court...
by attempting to overrule Mobile v. Bolden."9 The Eleventh Circuit found
that although Congress had considered specifically the impact and binding
nature of the Court's constitutional interpretation, it had relied on its own
separate and independent "power to enforce the Civil War Amendments." 91
The court further determined that the congressional decision to adopt a results-
based test for voting discrimination was a legitimate exercise of its authority
83. Congress relied on its analogous Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcementpowers to enact
this legislation. See Hartman,Racial Vote Dilution and Separation of Powers: An Exploration of the Conflict
Between the Judicial "Intent" and the Legislative "Results" Standards, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 689, 740
(1982).
84. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
85. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66. ("[O]nly if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."). The Court went on to find that a showing
of "disproportionate effects" does not suffice as evidence of discriminatory purpose, id. at 67, and that
reliance on such a test to establish racial discrimination "is not consistent with the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause." Id. at 67-68.
86. See Hartman, supra note 83, at 739.
87. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 71.
88. "In Bolden, a plurality of the Supreme Court broke with precedent and substantially increased the
burden on plaintiffs in voting discrimination cases by requiring proof of discriminatory purpose. The
Committee has concluded that this intent test places an unacceptably difficult burden on plaintiffs. It diverts
the judicial injury [sic] from the crucial question of whether minorities have equal access to the electoral
process to a historical question of individual motives. In our view, proof of discriminatory purpose should
not be a prerequisite to establishing a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act." S. REP. No. 417,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982).
89. 731 F.2d 1546 (lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984).
90. Id. at 1556.
91. Id. (emphasis in the original).
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to enforce both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.92 The Supreme
Court declined to review Marengo on petition for certiorari and thereby sup-
ported the lower court's determination that Congress possesses an independent
power to interpret and enforce the Fourteenth Amendment even where it acts
to overrule a prior Supreme Court holding.93
Congress could similarly override the Croson Court's constitutional interpre-
tation of what constitues a record of specific discrimination. In the same way
that Congress found the intent standard adopted by the Court in Bolden to be
inordinately difficult and to preclude the redress of past voting discrimination
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 94 Congress could override
Croson's "qualified pools" standard to eliminate any unnecessary barriers to
the adoption of MBE set-aside programs and to ensure that the effects of past
discrimination are redressed within the construction industry.95 As in the case
of the 1982 Amendments, the authority for such action lies in Congress' special
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers.
It has been argued that the 1982 amendments constituted a mere modifica-
tion of judicial statutory interpretation, rather than a congressional override of
a constitutional holding.9 While such an assertion fits well with the rhetoric
that serves politicians seeking passage of needed legislation, an examination
of the Bolden decision and the changes wrought by the amendments shows the
superficiality of such an argument. The Bolden Court explicitly dismissed the
statutory claim on the ground that it added nothing to the plaintiff's case, and
immediately went on to interpret what it seemed to consider the more central
issue: whether Mobile's at-large voting system violated either the Fourteenth
or the Fifteenth Amemdment. 7 Thus, the Court arrived at a conclusion as to
what constituted voting discrimination under the Civil War Amendments, and
in so doing clearly described its task as constitutional, not statutory, interpreta-
tion.9s Congress directly contradicted this interpretation and adopted the inter-
92. Id. at 1556-57.
93. Cert. denied, United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 469 U.S. 976 (1984).
94. Congress found "(1) that the difficulties faced by plaintiffs forced to prove discriminatory intent
through case-by-case adjudication create a substantial risk that intentional discrimination barred by the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments will go undetected, uncorrected and undeterred unless the results
test proposed for section 2 is adopted; and (2) that voting practices and procedures that have discriminatory
results perpetuate the effects of past purposeful discrimination." S. REP. No. 417, supra note 88, at 40
(footnote omitted).
95. The Voting Amendments of 1982 also provide precedent for congressional efforts to remedy the
effects of past discrimination. The drafters of amended section 2 specifically stated that one of the aims
of the legislation was to eliminate systems that perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. See S. REP.
No. 417, supra note 88, at 40; H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1981).
96. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 417, supra note 88 ("Congress cannot alter the judicial interpretations in
Bolden of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by simple statute. But the proposed amendment to
section 2 does not seek to reverse the Court's constitutional interpretation. Rather, the proposal is a proper
statutory exercise of Congress' enforcement power.. . and it is not a redefinition of the scope of the
Constitutional provisions.").
97. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980).
98. id. at 65-66.
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pretation which the Court had rejected.99 Such a clear override of a judicial
standard must be accurately characterized: Congress, in effect, if not in name,
overruled a Supreme Court interpretation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. 100
3. Power to Use Race-Based Remedies
The proposed legislation might be challenged as violative of equal protec-
tion in that it advantages and disadvantages particular groups on the basis of
race. The claim would be that the Constitution mandates a strictly color-blind
interpretation of equal protection wherein there can never be disparate treatment
on the basis of one's race.101 However, the need to redress the effects of past
discrimination continues,"° the equal protection clause permits such re-
dress,0 3 and if Congress determines that race-based remedies are the only
effective means to enforce equal protection guarantees, it may rely on its unique
section 5 remedial powers to do so.)04
99. See Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent
Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 764 (1983) ("Congress, in amending section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
has acted to overrule the Bolden plurality's requirement that discriminatory intent be proved to establish
a violation.").
100. It might be argued also that the Civil Rights Act of 1990, which sought to modify the Court's
holdings in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989), Wards Cove Packing Co. V. Atonio,
109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989), Martin v. W'flks, 109 S.
Ct. 2180 (1989), and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989), if it had passed, might have
provided additional support for the override of ajudicial constitutional interpretation by Congress. See 136
Cong. Rec. S1522 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 136 Cong. Rec. E229 (daily ed. Feb.
7 1990) (statement of Rep. Hawkins). However, the legislation affects only the statutory interpretation of
Title VII; it does not attempt to provide an alternative interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
101. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at735 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (applying color-blind approach
to all racial classifications). But see Fulilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 482 (1980) ("[Wle reject the
contention that in the remedial context the Congress must act in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion.); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,208 (1979) (affirmative action plan that reserved for Black employees
50% of the openings in plant's training program did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white
employees"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355 (1978) ("'[O]ur Constitution is
color-blind' . . . has never been adopted by this Court as the proper meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause.") (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting in part).
102. See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 450 (1986) ("Affirmative action
'promptly operates to change the outward and visible signs of yesterday's racial distinctions and thus, to
provide an impetus to the process of dismantling the barriers, psychological or otherwise, erected by past
practices."') (citing NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 1974)); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 279, 280 (1986) (Court recognized that race-based remedies may be necessary to eradicate effects
of prior discrimination even though it found program in Wygant to be invalid).
103. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 477 ("congressional authority extends beyond the prohibition of purposeful
discrimination to encompass state action that has discriminatory impact perpetuating the effects of past
discrimination") (citation omitted); City of Rome v. U.S., 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980) ("Congress may, under
the authority of [the enforcement provision of] the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibit state action that, though
in itself is not violative of §1, perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.").
104. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483 ("It is fundamental that in no organ of government, state or federal,
does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in Congress, expressly charged with
competence and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees.").
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Enforcement requires the imposition of a remedy. The Court has used race-
based remedies for its own enforcement efforts. 105 Congressional enforcement
power explictly granted by the Fourteenth Amendment must at a minimum be
co-equal with the Court's."ns Therefore, Congress should be equally able to
impose race-based remedial programs.
The Court acknowledged that Congress possesses the authority to adopt
such a remedy. In Fullilove, the Court upheld congressional race-based set-
asides for federal construction contracts based on Congress' special section 5
powers.0 7 Moreover, in Croson, Justice O'Connor reaffirmed congressional
authority to adopt race-based set-aside programs based on "the unique remedial
powers of Congress under section 5. '108
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,109 the Court once again accepted
Congress' authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to adopt programs that
employ benign racial classifications to redress past discrimination based on
independent criteria. In addition, the Court reaffirmed Congress' section 5
enforcement power: "Congress [is] a co-equal branch charged by the Constitu-
tion with the power to. .. 'enforce, by appropriate legislation,' the equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."" 0
The Court's determination that a state's race-based program is unconstitu-
tional does not preclude Congress from independently sanctioning a similar
race-based program under its section 5 enforcement powers."' For example,
in Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board,"2 the Court found literacy tests
to be permissible under section 1. However, Congress interpreted section 1 to
prohibit literacy tests and legislated accordingly. In Morgan, the Court upheld
Congress' interpretation, thereby supporting congressional authority to indepen-
dently interpret and enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, even after the judiciary
had rejected the same interpretation.13 Thus, Congress may interpret section
1 to permit the adoption of MBE programs even where the Court has previously
rejected this interpretation.
In summary, Congress' section 5 enforcement powers place the federal
legislative branch in a pseudo-judicial role, permitting Congress to prohibit
105. See Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (imposing arace-conscious
remedy to redress discrimination).
106. See Bohrer, supra note 60, at 494 ("Congress' power to enforce section 1 is no more limited than
that approved for judicial use.").
107. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483.
108. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 718.
109. 58 U.S.L.W. 5053, 5057 (1990) ("We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by
Congress--even if those measures are not "remedial" in the sense of being designed to compensate victims
of past governmental or societal discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve
important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.") (footnote omitted).
110. Id. (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472).
111. See Bohrer, supra note 60, at 495.
112. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
113. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648.
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discrimination on the basis of race, to determine where discrimination exists,
and to design remedies to redress the effects of such discrimination.
4. Power to Compel State Action
Congress has a mandate under the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate
discrimination that it identifies. Once the decision is made to adopt a national
legislative solution to allow states to redress the continuing effects of discrimi-
nation, it is natural that Congress would take the next step and compel state
compliance where discrimination is found to exist." 4 States might challenge
this aspect of the legislation on the grounds that it infringes on powers reserved
to the states by the Tenth Amendment. However, there is little basis for such
a claim given that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted specifically to
protect individual rights against state infringement.15 That is, the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted with the specific intent to limit state power in relation
to the perpetuation of discrimination on the basis of race." 6
In Missouri v. Jenkins,"7 the Supreme Court addressed the balance to be
drawn between state autonomy under the Tenth Amendment and state compli-
ance with the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that a local school
district could be "ordered [by a court] to levy taxes.., in order to compel the
discharge of an obligation imposed on [it] by the Fourteenth Amendment."" 8
The state of Missouri had maintained that such an order exceeded the Court's
Article III remedial powers."9 However, the decision clearly established that
the authority to require affirmative state action with respect to a governmental
function typically reserved to state discretion under the Tenth Amendment-
namely the taxing of real property-fell within the bounds of judicial power,
where the Court mandated such action to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
114. The proposed statute can be adapted either to compel states to adopt race-based remedies where
discriminatory impact is found to exist or merely to permit the use of race-based programs to alleviate the
effects of past discrimination. If the goal of Congress is to compel the use of MBE set-asides, the word
"shall" can be subsituted in the statute for the word "may." The relevant substitution points are indicated
in the proposed legislation by a bracketed "[shall]" following "may." The bracketed portion of subsection
(c) would be added where the statute compels states to adopt MBE set-aside programs.
115. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,243 n.18 (1983) (Fourteenth Amendment section 5 powers
override state autonomy embodied in the Tenth Amendment); United States v. Marengo County Comm'n,
731 F.2d 1546, 1561 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 976"(1984) ("By their very nature [the Civil
War Amendments] plainly empowered the federal government to intervene in state and local affairs to
protect the rights of minorities newly granted citizenship."); G. STONE, L. SEiDMAN, C. St-NSTEN & M.
TUSHNET, CONSTITTrONAL LAW 447 (1986) (The "primary impetus for passage of the fourteenth amend-
ment was the need to provide a basis for federal legislative action against the states.") (emphasis in original);
Bohrer, supra note 60, at 480.
116. "The Civil War Amendments themselves worked a dramatic change in the balance between
congressional and state power over matters of race." Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719.
117. 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990).
118. Id. at 1666.
119. Id. at 1665.
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ment.120 The Court went beyond merely prohibiting unlawful conduct and
imposed a remedy which required the state to implement a new system of
taxation previously unauthorized under Missouri law.
Congressional enforcement power explicitly granted by the Fourteenth
Amendment is co-equal with the Court's.12' Given that the enforcement pow-
ers of Congress and the Supreme Court are coextensive, Congress has the same
authority as that granted to the Court in Jenkins to order states to implement
actions which would otherwise be reserved to the nondelegated powers of the
states under the Tenth Amendment. The federal government's authority to
employ race-based remedies to redress past discrimination, 22 combined with
the general subordination of Tenth Amendment powers to the maintenance of
equal protection guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment 23 permits a
federally mandated MBE set-aside program. The proposed legislation would
not overstep the bounds of congressional authority to regulate state practices
in the allocation of government contracts.
IV. CONCLUSION
The proposed legislation will correct the conflict inherent in the Croson
decision. While the legislation relies upon directives extracted from both Croson
and Fullilove, it may override Croson in that it replaces the Court's "qualified
contractors" standard for establishing specific discrimination with a more
inclusive test. The authority for a congressional override of Croson derives from
the special enforcement powers delegated to Congress in section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Congress previously exercised this independent section
5 power to override a judicial standard when it adopted the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1982.'14 Implementation of the proposed statute would simply
build on this precedent. The proposed federal legislative answer to Croson
would further the ideals of equal protection by allowing a broader application
of race-based remedies to correct the effects of past discrimination.
120. id. at 1666 ("[S]tate policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication of federal
constitutional guarantees") (citing North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971)).
121. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
122. See Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 448.
123. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2302 (1989) ("The Fourteenth Amendment...
was avowedly directed against the power of the States.") (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
124. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973b, 1973aa-la,
1973aa-6 (1982)).
[Vol. 100: 451
